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The Many Ways to Prove Discrimination 
A Book Review by Vikram David Amar * 
For those who believe the debate concerning anti-discrimination law 
and policy has become stale, Ian Ayres' book, Pervasive Prejudice?: 
Unconventional Evidence of Race and Gender Discrimination, is a breath 
of fresh air. I As the title of the book itself suggests, some of the evidence 
Professor Ayres adduces is unusual. But his evidence is not the only thing 
that is unconventional- much of Ayres' analysis is new, creative and quite 
stimulating. Indeed, for a generalist like me who thinks about anti-
discrimination principles as they relate to broader areas of law like 
constitutional law, Ayres' analytic frameworks and suggested reforms are 
as important as is the powerful empirical documentation of existing 
discrimination that he reports. 
The book is broken up into three major Parts. Part I involves disparate 
treatment on account of race or gender, i.e., situations in which person A 
treats person B differently because of person B's race or gender. The race-
or gender-consciousness on the part of person A can be either intentional or 
subconscious, but either way person B's race and/or gender is influencing 
person A's actions. 
Professor Ayres focuses on covert disparate treatment in the retail 
sector. He properly points out that many people assume that a profit 
motive makes disparate racial or gender treatment unlikely in the retail 
setting, and he does a good job of analyzing why those assumptions may 
not be well founded. More importantly, his work in the first Part begins to 
address the large void in existing empirical work, to test whether retail 
racial and gender discrimination continue to exist in today's world. 
Drawing largely on studies he and others have done in retail car 
markets in the Chicago area, Ayres adduces overwhelming evidence that 
dealerships consistently and significantly discriminate, in the way they 
negotiate terms of a deal, against women and racial minority customers. In 
particular, Ayres shows that dealerships offered white males significantly 
• Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. 
1. IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE?: UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE AND 
GENDER DISCRIMINATION (2001). Ian Ayres is the William K. Townsend Professor of Law 
at Yale Law School. 
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lower prices than blacks and women. The average prices offered to white 
women in the experiments were more than $200 higher than the prices 
offered to white men, and the offers to black women were $400 higher than 
those given to white men. The offers made to black men were highest of 
all, more than $900 higher than the offers made to white men. 
The studies' methodologies were simple enough, but meticulous. Pairs 
of testers (one of whom was always a white male) were specifically trained 
to pursue a uniform bargaining strategy when dealing with the salespeople. 
They were then sent out to negotiate for the purchase of new cars at 
randomly selected dealerships located throughout the Chicago metropolitan 
region. Professor Ayres' objective, of course, was to have the testers differ 
only by race and/or gender. In other words, aside from their race and 
gender, the testers were to present a uniform appearance and uniform 
consumer behavior. All the testers were drawn from the same age range, 
had similar educational backgrounds, wore to the dealerships similar 
clothing, drove to the dealerships in similar cars, told the dealers they 
would self-finance the purchase, told the dealers they had the same 
occupations, provided the dealers with addresses in the same 
neighborhoods, and even were chosen to be of similar physical 
attractiveness. Moreover, each tester was told to focus quickly on a 
particular car, elicit an offer by the dealer, wait exactly 5 minutes before 
responding with a counteroffer that was slightly more than the dealer's 
marginal cost on that car (thus signaling to the dealer a knowledgeable 
purchaser) and then see what counteroffer the dealer came back with. 
Because the testers were essentially following a scripted course of 
negotiating strategy (i.e., the testers were told exactly what price to ask for, 
exactly how to respond to counteroffers, etc.), any systematic differences in 
the way they were treated by the dealers (Le., the best and final offers made 
by the dealers) could be attributed only to race or gender. In short, the 
evidence Professor Ayres adduced in this Part is devastating to those who 
think women and minorities are not treated worse in the marketplace. 
Moreover, because the differential treatment of white men versus other 
customers was so pronounced, Professor Ayres argues convincingly that 
any other variables that cannot easily be controlled for (such as how often 
each tester blinked during the test, or how gracefully each tester sat down 
in the driver's seat, etc.) cannot by themselves explain the results. It is 
quite clear that race and gender do matter to the dealers. 
Why they matter to the dealers is another question altogether. Ayres 
speculates about possible causal explanations for the race- and gender-
consciousness, ranging from racial animus to "rational" statistical 
inferences based upon a profit-maximizing goaL This section of the book 
(the chapter entitled "Toward Causal Explanation") is a bit less helpful than 
most of the others. While Ayres' deconstruction of possible causal 
mechanisms is very intriguing and educational, his bottom line is that 44[i]n 
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the end, it may prove impossible to parse out the various elements of 
animus and rational inferences from irrational stereotypes.,,2 Ayres may 
well be right here (and his evidence does point in conflicting directions), 
but if he is correct, then one wonders what to make of his introductory 
comment at the beginning of the chapter to the effect that "[0 ]nly with an 
accurate understanding of the reasons for dealer behavior can regulators 
hope to determine what, if any, governmental intervention might 
effectively protect black and/or female customers.,,3 I myself am not 
entirely convinced that we do need to know why race and gender are being 
used in order to effectively stop them from being used, but if Ayres 
believes this, his punch line of indeterminacy comes up a tad short. 
The final piece of Part I - Ayres' refutation of the idea that victims can 
protect themselves from retail discrimination by selecting their own 
bargaining strategies and choosing the dealers they visit - does not come 
up short at all. Richard Epstein, for example, has argued that "[i]fblacks or 
women know that they are apt to get a good deal. from some small fraction 
of the market, then they can avoid other, less receptive dealerships and 
their unattractive offers.,,4 As Professor Ayres points out, "[t]he audit tests 
themselves provide powerful evidence that African Americans cannot 
protect themselves from the effects of discrimination by merely searching 
for and shifting their consumption to non discriminating dealers,"s because 
one key finding of the studies is that discrimination was pervasive across 
all the dealerships tested. Even by avoiding suburban neighborhoods or 
dealerships located in areas with very few minorities, African Americans 
could not escape the widespread discrimination in the car retail sector. 
Moreover, even if (as may be true to some extent) minorities could 
reduce (but not eliminate) the effect of discrimination against them by 
employing different bargaining strategies than those used by the testers, 
forcing minorities to use a particular type of bargaining strategy itself 
[R]epresent[ s] an important type of race discrimination. This is 
especially true if the alternative path to a good deal [is] 
significantly more onerous. If whites need only bargain for four 
hours to negotiate a low markup, but blacks must negotiate for 
eight hours, then a finding that blacks in equilibrium did not pay 
more [than whites] for cars would not mean that blacks were 
2. ld. at 85. 
3. ld. at 45. 
4. ld. at 88; see also Ian Ayres, Alternative Grounds: Epstein's Discrimination Analysis 
in Older Market Settings, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 67, 81 (1994) (quoting RICHARD A. 
EpSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINA nON LAWS 52 
(1992)); Richard A. Epstein, Standing Firm, on Forbidden Ground, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
1, 52-53 (1994). 
5. AYRES, supra note 1, at 90. 
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uninjured by the dealerships' disparate treatment.6 
Part II of Pervasive Prejudice? focuses not on disparate treatment, but 
rather on disparate impact, the other major analytic vehicle used by 
plaintiffs under the nation's anti-discrimination laws. To make out a claim 
of disparate impact, a plaintiff must show that a particular device or 
practice by the defendant has an uneven racial or gender effect - a disparate 
racial or gender impact - that burdens minorities or women more than 
whites or men. Once a disparate impact has been shown, the question 
becomes whether the impact is justified by reference to some legitimate 
objective the defendant is trying to accomplish that is unrelated to race or 
sex bias. If so, the disparate impact is tolerated; if not, the disparate impact 
dooms the defendant's practice or device. 
Professor Ayres illustrates and documents the disparate impact theory 
using two unusual factual backdrops - kidney transplants and bail setting. 
As for kidney transplants, Ayres adduces studies to demonstrate that the 
federal government's rules for allocating kidney transplants - rules that 
focus on antigen matching - disproportionately disqualify potential black 
recipients. Such disparate impact, the federal government had traditionally 
argued, was the unfortunate but unavoidable side effect of a policy that 
otherwise made good medical sense in that antigen matching was the most 
reasonable available method for identifying recipients whose bodies were 
most likely to physiologically accept (rather than reject) the transplanted 
kidneys. It turned out, though, as Professor Ayres demonstrates, that the 
antigen point matching system used by the government did not reduce 
rejection rates any more than did a modified antigen point system (in which 
antigen matching was still relevant but downplayed) that had a much less 
pronounced racially disparate impact would have. Thus, Professor Ayres' 
studies showed, much of the disparate impact under the original antigen 
point system was unjustified by any medical benefits. 
As Professor Ayres himself acknowledges, the disparate impact 
analysis undertaken in the kidney studies is quite methodologically 
conventional - a "traditional empirical approach" that looks at two sets of 
data to make out a disparate impact claim: One set of data which 
documents the racially disparate impact itself (which shows that absent the 
antigen matching program, a higher percentage of blacks would qualify for 
transplants); and a second set of data that shows that the impact is not 
justified by any medical upside (a study of the antigen matching program 
and rejection rates). This conventional analysis is performed by Ayres 
quite well - but it is conventional nonetheless. Indeed, the two most 
remarkable aspects of the kidney discussion are the compelling real-life 
implications of the study, and the fact that the study actually influenced the 
federal government to alter its policies to ameliorate the needless disparate 
6. Id. at 9l. 
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impact. This Part of the book is a helpful reminder to all of us in the 
academy that scholarship can influence important policy. 
The bail setting study in Part II, by contrast, not only makes for good 
real-life drama, but also contains important methodological innovation as 
well. Professor Ayres analyzes the bail setting practices used by state 
judges in criminal cases in New Haven, Connecticut. As Professor Ayres 
explains: "The traditional way to statistically test for discrimination in bail 
setting is to estimate in a regression how factors that are both permissible 
(that is, related to a defendant's flight risk) and observable (that is, seen by 
the judge at the time of bail setting) affect the size of bail, and then to 
determine whether, after controlling for these factors, race is still a 
significant determinant of the bail amount.,,7 In other words, one looking at 
the amount of bail set in all cases would try to control for things like how 
serious the alleged crime is, whether the defendant had ever fled before, 
whether the defendant has a job, etc., and inquire whether - after all these 
factors are held constant - there is still a racially disparate impact, i.e., 
within each small group of defendants who share all relevant 
characteristics, bail rates set for blacks are higher. 
The problem with this traditional approach - and it is a problem for all 
traditional disparate impact methodology is that critics will always charge 
that some important factor was not adequately controlled for. For example, 
in the hypothetical above, someone might say, "You didn't control for 
whether a defendant had family in the area something a judge could 
legitimately take into account in setting bail - and the fact that blacks in 
your study had higher bail rates may just mean they had fewer family 
members in the area." Ayres refers to this problem as the "omitted 
variable" problem. This methodological difficulty has made it 
"exceedingly difficult to use regression analysis to demonstrate racial 
discrimination. ,,8 
To get around this problem, Ayres makes use in the bail arena of what 
he calls an "outcome test." Rather than focusing on the bond amounts set 
for blacks to see if they are higher (which they are, but perhaps for reasons 
unrelated to race), Ayres focuses on the outcomes of the bond setting - the 
actual flight rates.9 If, at the end of the day, bail bond setting decisions 
7. Jd. at 238. 
8. Jd. at 239. This omitted variable problem can plague some disparate treatment 
methodology as well. For example, critics who disbelieve the auto dealer tests described 
earlier may claim that some important tester variable, such as whether the tester seemed 
confident or not, was omitted from the testing methodology. 
9. Actually, Ayres says there is no clear empirical data as to real flight rates broken 
down by race, so Ayres uses what he says is the next best thing - the prices charged by bail 
bondsmen to black and white defendants. Because the bail bondsman market functions 
well, prices charged by bail bondsmen should correspond to the flight risks and rates 
presented by various groups of defendants. Ayres points out that bail bondsmen effectively 
charge less to black than to white defendants, which means that the bail amounts set for 
blacks are unjustifiably high. 
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produce higher court appearance rates for minority defendants than for 
whites (that is to say, a higher percentage of whites on bail flee and forfeit 
the bond), then we may infer that the bond setting decisions have an 
unjustified disparate impact on minority defendants. Ayres' data indicates 
that bail reduced the probability of flight for minority defendants below the 
flight probability for white defendants. In other words, judges are setting 
bail rates so as to demand a lower probability of flight for minorities than 
for whites - they are setting bail in such a way as to tolerate more white 
flight than black flight. 
As I will explain below, this "outcome test" methodology is quite 
interesting and potentially quite powerful. This feature alone quite literally 
makes Part II a must-read. 
Part III of the book discusses affirmative action, or at least a particular 
kind of affirmative action: Programs by the federal government that give 
women- and minority-owned broadcasting stations a major subsidy in the 
competitive bidding auction process for licenses allocated by the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC). In particular, minority- or women-
owned businesses are required to pay about only half of what they bid in 
order to obtain the licenses in the auction. The FCC's objective, in making 
race and gender relevant, is to increase broadcast diversity; the race or sex 
of the license owner may affect the content of the programming aired under 
the license. 
In addition to being attacked as "reverse discrimination," such 
programs have been criticized as huge giveaways of federal resources. 
Counter-intuitively enough, Professor Ayres in this Part of the book 
demonstrates that the overall revenue to the federal government for the sale 
of the licenses increased by more than 12% under the minority- and 
women-owned business preference program. 
As Ayres explains, "[a]lthough at first blush it seems that allowing 
designated bidders to pay fifty cents on the dollar would necessarily reduce 
the government's revenue,,,IO in fact subsidizing some bidders created extra 
competition in the auction and drove up the successful bid prices for the 
remaining, unsubsidized, slots. The unsubsidized firms bid more than they 
would have absent the subsidy program because there were fewer licenses 
for which they could actually compete (once the subsidy effectively set 
aside a number of licenses for women and minorities). 
Two points about Professor Ayres' affirmative action parable bear 
quick mention. First (as he acknowledges), the phenomenon he describes 
would occur if any slots were effectively set aside for any group of 
applicants - the fact that the subsidy was allotted on the basis of race and 
gender was irrelevant to the auction effect he describes. Second, a desire to 
increase revenue could not, by itself, ever justify government race 
10. AYRES, supra note 1, at 316. 
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consciousness, and Professor Ayres never suggests otherwise. 
Nonetheless, his surprising economic punch line about affirmative action 
provides, as I suggest below, a lot offood for thought. 
Making one's way through the detail of the three Parts of the book is 
no mean feat Let me be clear. The book is quite carefully and well 
written. But it nevertheless does demand a lot of attention and a fair level 
of sophistication on the part of the reader. The subject matter is 
complicated, and some of the ideas are nuanced. A background in, or at 
least a feel for, basic microeconomic reasoning and statistical analysis 
definitely helps. So too does a familiarity with the fundamental framework 
of anti-discrimination law. The people (both lawyers and non-lawyers) 
who will derive the most from the book are people who like to think hard 
as they read, and who don't mind stopping every five pages or so to reflect 
upon what they have just read. 
But if you are that kind of person, you will surely benefit from reading 
this book. The different kinds of proofs of discrimination are interesting in 
themselves. In fact, Professor Ayres proves race- or gender-consciousness 
in many different ways: He focuses on the overt text of some policies (like 
the FCC's); he employs testers to demonstrate disparate treatment; he uses 
traditional multi-variable regression analysis to examine unjustified 
disparate impact; he devises "outcome tests" to uncover other unjustified 
disparate impacts, and he also makes use of "principal audits" - a device 
whereby an agent who is discriminating on behalf of a principal can be 
induced into admitting the discriminatory instructions given by the 
principal. 
It is where the book goes, prescriptively, however, that makes it even 
more deeply worthwhile. In the few pages I have here I can't come close 
to doing justice to this aspect of the book, but let me raise a few 
possibilities. 
IMPLICA nONS 
One big suggestion Professor Ayres makes is to extend anti-
discrimination law to protect against gender-consciousness in the retail 
sector. Professor Ayres correctly points out that housing, education and 
employment - and not retail sales - have been the primary domain of anti-
discrimination statutes. Moreover, one of the major federal statutes that 
may reach retail sales - section 1981, which prohibits discrimination in the 
making and enforcing of contracts - speaks only to race and not to gender. 
I think Professor Ayres is undoubtedly correct that extension of anti-
discrimination laws in the ways he suggests is a step in the right direction. 
But will such extension do much? That, of course, depends upon the ease 
with which the rights embodied in any extension of law can be vindicated 
in courts. 
To address that enforcement problem, Professor Ayres encourages 
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broader use of the kind of tester studies he utilized in the Chicago auto 
dealerships. Like the extension of the laws themselves, an increase in the 
number of well-designed testing studies is undeniably a good thing.!! But 
even these studies are going to be of limited use in actual court cases, for a 
few reasons. 
First, as Professor Ayres concedes, many testing studies will be 
criticized for not adequately constraining the discretionary conduct of the 
testers. If two testers are not in all relevant respects absolutely identical 
(except for race and/or gender), then a defendant who treats them 
differently might not be doing so because of race- or gender-consciousness. 
Second, as Professor Ayres hints but does not thoroughly discuss, a 
plaintiff who is not a tester (but rather who is a bona fide woman or 
minority customer) may have difficulty using even a well-designed test to 
prove that slbe was discriminated against. Just because a defendant 
discriminated against black or women testers does not mean slbe 
discriminated against a non-tester black or woman plaintiff. A non-tester 
plaintiff who, say, was offered a car deal slbe didn't like cannot point to a 
white or male who necessarily got a better deal for the same car on the 
exact same day, etc. 
One way around this dilemma for a plaintiff would be, as Ayres 
suggests, to use a pattern or practice class action device. But such devices, 
whereby statistical evidence of a pattern of discrimination can be used by 
any plaintiff who is a member of the same racial or gender group, is quite 
constrained. 12 
Finally, even if a pattern or practice class action or other device 
enabled an individual non-tester plaintiff to use the pattern or practice of 
discrimination established by the test, such a device would be available 
only against actual retailers who had been tested and failed. A pattern or 
practice of discrimination by one retailer surely couldn't be used to prove 
discrimination against another retailer who happens to sell the same kinds 
of goods or services. And because each test is complicated to.design and 
expensive to administer, even a significant expansion of testing will not 
result in very many retailers being snagged.13 
II. Professor Ayres does note, however, that there may be ethical considerations that 
limit some kinds of tester studies. See id. at 40l. 
12. For example, in a case that Ayres mentions, McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), 
the Supreme Court did not allow a criminal defendant to use statistical evidence of race 
discrimination by juries in general to prove that his jury acted discriminatorily. Id. at 294. 
In so deciding, the Court said that every jury is different and that juries act for many 
different reasons. Id. The Court also said that employment was one of the few areas where 
statistical evidence should be allowed. Id I suspect that the retail sector could easily be 
analogized to the employment sector, and distinguished from the criminal procedure setting, 
but these are questions Professor Ayres' suggestions raise but do not answer. See AYRES, 
supra note 1, at 239. 
13. It is possible, of course, that if more testing were done, the fear of being tested and 
caught would deter large numbers of retailers from violating the law in the way that, say, the 
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The difficulty of proving disparate treatment leads Ayres to suggest 
that perhaps more anti-discrimination laws be styled so as to make 
disparate impact actionable. For example, Professor Ayres suggests that a 
retailer's decision to allow its salespeople to negotiate at all might have a 
disparate impact along racial and gender lines, which should cause us to 
ask whether much is really served by permitting negotiation to take place. 
Do retailers really need to be able to negotiate, or instead should they be 
encouraged (or perhaps, as Ayres suggests, required by regulation) to 
abandon negotiation discretion and move to the Saturn car model for 
pricing? 
Ayres' discussion here, like his discussion elsewhere, prompts a lot of 
thoughts. My own thoughts here drifted to the similar question being 
waged in the affirmative action debate pending in the Supreme Court. In 
papers filed in the current University· of Michigan cases,14 the Solicitor 
General has argued that the university's affirmative action program is not 
narrowly tailored, and thus not constitutional, because there were "race 
neutral" alternatives that the university should have pursued, but did not. 
In particular, Michigan should, the Solicitor General says, have made use 
of plans like those in effect in California or Texas, where admissions 
criteria that have racially disparate impacts, like SAT scores, are de-
emphasized so that more people of color are admitted. I have written 
elsewhere that such plans, which sacrifice criteria that schools otherwise 
believe contribute to academic excellence, may not be the best idea in the 
world. IS 
The question there is analytically similar to the question here: What do 
we lose by abandoning a practice that has a disparate impact? I admit that 
my instincts about what we lose when we change admissions criteria differ 
from my intuitions about how much is lost when we get rid of automobile 
negotiations, but these divergent gut senses may be due to the fact that I 
make my living in education rather than in the car marketplace. Certainly 
the abstract question of whether negotiation itself has any social or 
economic utility is a large one that Professor Ayres only begins to explore 
in this book. 
Since I just mentioned the University of Michigan cases, this is a good 
place to make note of another thought Professor Ayres' intriguing analysis 
triggered concerning educational affirmative action. Professor Ayres 
shows how government revenue actually went up because of the FCC 
Securities and Exchange Commission uses high-profile prosecutions to ensure more general 
compliance. 
14. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir.), cert granted 123 S. Ct. 617 (2002); 
Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2000), cert. granted 123 S. Ct. 602 
(2002). 
15. Vikram D. Amar, The Bush Administration and the Supreme Court's Michigan 
Affirmative Action Cases: Narrow Tailoring and Alternative Methods of Ensuring Diversity 
(Feb. 7,2003), at http://writ.news.find1aw.com/amar/20030207.html. 
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license set-aside programs. I wonder whether perhaps race-based 
affirmative action in education has had a similar effect. In other words, are 
the grades and scores of the white admittees higher today than they were 
before race-based affirmative action, because there are fewer (non-
affirmative action) slots to compete for than there used to be?16 Of course, 
a company can increase the· size of its bid for a license so long as it has 
money, whereas presumably a white university applicant doesn't have an 
unlimited capacity to increase his grades or scores. But to the extent that 
many students don't always push themselves to perform to the full extent 
of their capabilities, the question should be asked: Has affirmative action 
actually increased the overall academic quality of student bodies (putting 
aside the quite real but hard-to-quantify benefit that comes from diversity 
itself) by ratcheting up the competition (and thus the work ethic) among 
white applicants? I'd love to see Professor Ayres take up that empirical 
question. 
Finally, I have a few thoughts/questions about Professor Ayres' 
extremely important idea that "outcome tests" should be employed more in 
anti-discrimination law. As Professor Ayres summarizes, "[t]he basic idea 
of the outcome test is to analyze whether the outcomes (about which the 
decisionmaker cares) are systematically different for minorities and 
nonminorities.,,17 Professor Ayres correctly identifies the main virtue of 
such an approach - its elimination of the "omitted variable" problem that 
plagues traditional regression analysis in disparate impact and disparate 
treatment cases. By focusing on one set of data - the outcome success rates 
we avoid quarrels about whether we have controlled for all other relevant 
variables in doing the regression analysis to see if the seemingly disparate 
treatment can be explained or the disparate impact justified. The New 
Haven bail setting case is a great example. If judges are setting bail 
amounts that seem to do their job less effectively for whites than for blacks, 
judges must unjustifiably be concerned more with black flight than white 
flight. 
Professor Ayres identifies a few limitations on the use of outcome 
tests; they may not always catch discrimination that does exist because of 
the so-called "inframarginality problem" and they may sometimes falsely 
suggest improper discrimination because of something called the 
"subgroup validity problem.,,18 
I believe, however, that there is a related, but larger limitation, on the 
outcome test approach, namely, that it works only when we all agree that 
16. Even if slots aren't formally reserved for minorities (as the Bakke decision says they 
cannot be), the competition between non-minorities for admission heats up whenever there 
is race-based affirmative action. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 483 U.S. 265 
(1978). 
17 . AYRES, supra note 1, at 404. 
18. ld. at 408, 412. 
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there is only one main objective that the decisionmaker is trying to 
accomplish, and we can therefore test the outcome by reference to that 
objective. For example, in the bail setting context, we infer that the judges' 
differential bail rates for whites and blacks are unjustified only because we 
agree that the only thing bail is supposed to do is deter flight, and because 
we have racially-disparate flight rates. But the more objectives the 
decisionmaker is trying to accomplish, the more outcomes we must 
examine, and the more an outcome test begins to suffer the problems of a 
multiple regression analysis. 
To see this, consider the following two outcome findings that Ayres 
says may indicate racial problems: 19 
1. If editorial acceptance decisions produce higher citation rates for 
articles written by minorities than by whites, we might infer that 
acceptance decisions have an unjustified disparate impact in 
excluding qualified minority articles; and 
2. If police search decisions are systematically less productive in 
yielding evidence with regard to minorities than with regard to 
whites, we might infer that search decisions have an unjustified 
disparate impact in subjecting undeserving minorities to being 
searched. 
Both of these assertions are plausible if, but only if, we believe that the 
decisionmaker in each case had a single objective whose outcome success 
can be easily measured.20 In the editorial illustration, for instance, suppose 
the editor of the journal cares about more than how many times the articles 
he accepts are cited. Suppose he cares about where they are cited, and by 
whom they are cited, and for how many years in the future they are cited, 
etc. It may be that minority-authored articles are cited more often, but in 
less well-regarded journals, and by less prominent academics, etc. 
More provocatively, suppose the editor wants the pieces he publishes 
to be cited by other scholars who do not personally know the cited authors, 
and suppose further that minority scholars are a relatively closely knit 
group, who keep in better touch with each other than non-minority 
scholars. It might be, then, that minority scholars are being cited more by 
other minority scholars (some of whom they know), but are being cited less 
by scholars whom they do not personally knoW.21 
19. These examples are drawn verbatim from Ayres. See id. at 405-06. 
20. I am struck here by an analogy to constitutional law equal protection rationality 
review, and the problem of calling a law "irrational" when it is designed to achieve multiple 
purposes. See Vikram D. Amar, Some Questions About Perfectionist Rationality Review, 45 
HASTINGS L.J. 1029 (1994); Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality and Equal Protection, 82 
YALE LJ. 123 (I 972). 
21. In the same vein, if the bail bondsmen in Professor Ayres' studies had been offering 
lower rates to black defendants because of personal acquaintance, or because the bondsmen 
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In the search and seizure context, suppose police conduct searches not 
only to yield evidence, but to let criminals suspected of certain crimes 
know that they are being watched as well. Suppose police conduct many 
searches of suspected drug dealers in part because they want to shake up 
drug dealers, even if the police themselves are not always confident that 
their searches will tum up anything.22 In other words, it might be that 
police do not search each and every time they have satisfied some 
minimum "probable cause" Fourth Amendment threshold, but rather 
choose to search only a subset of searchees as to whom they have probable 
cause, and make that choice taking into account the crimes for which the 
individuals are suspected. If minorities are overrepresented among drug 
dealers, then searches of minorities are going to be "less productive" than 
searches of whites, even if there is no race consciousness (i.e., even if 
police are not setting different thresholds for conducting searches based on 
race), and even if there are good policy reasons (i.e., keeping drug dealers 
on edge) to justify the disparate impact.23 
To see my point from another perspective, imagine that Asian law 
students have lower law school GPAs than white law students. Under an 
outcome test reasoning, someone might try to infer that either the school is 
taking race into account at the admissions stage against white applicants, or 
that white applicants are suffering an unjustified disparate impact by some 
aspect of the admissions criteria.24 To my mind, such an inference would 
be unwarranted. Perhaps the school is making a concerted effort to have 
more science majors, because it wants to build a strong alumni network in 
the law and technology and intellectual property areas. And perhaps 
Asians are overrepresented among science major law school applicants 
(which may well be, at least in some states). If you suppose further (as also 
may be the case) that science majors might have lower law school GPAs 
than their non-science counterparts (perhaps because they have less 
experience writing essays), then the outcome we observe is neither the 
product of race consciousness, nor is it unjustified. But the outcome test 
failed to work here because law school grades are not the only outcomes 
themselves were engaging in race-based affirmative action to help defendants of color (as 
opposed to being driven by a profit motive), the outcome test methodology would have been 
less powerful. 
22. Let us assume, of course, that such searches - designed to keep criminals off guard 
and not just to gather evidence - are not umeasonable within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
23. Professor Ayres himself uses the drug dealer context to illustrate his "subgroup 
'validity" problem. While related, this problem is, I think:, distinct from the "multiple 
purpose" problem I am raising here. 
24. There is, of course, the possibility that Asian law students are themselves being 
victimized in law school grading by disparate treatment (which would be unlikely because 
of blind grading) or by an unjustified disparate impact in grading criteria. But for purposes 
of my hypothetical, let us assume neither of those is true. 
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about which law schools can and do legitimately care.25 
If I keep coming back to the educational affirmative action setting, it is 
only because that is the great anti-discrimination question of the day. And 
it is a good sign that although Professor Ayres' book does not specifically 
address the topic at any length, his ideas are extremely relevant to this 
momentous question. That kind of universal thought-provocation is, I 
would say, a sign of classic work. 
25. Again, this is why a context in which only one outcome is relevant to the decision 
maker - like bail setting - is the best illustration for Professor Ayres of the power of the 
outcome test idea. 
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